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HAZARDS EVALUATION OF PLUTONIUM METAL OPENING AND STABILIZATION

INTRODUCTION
A Hazards Evaluation (HE) was done for the opening of containers of Pu metal, conversion of the metal and corrosion products to plutonium oxide product, and sampling, testing and packaging the product. Hazards evaluation is the analysis ofthe significance of hazardous situations associated with an activity or process. The HE used the qualitative techniques of Hazard and Operability (HazOp) analysis and What-If analysis to identify those elements of handling and thermal stabilization processing that could lead to accidents.
METAL OPENING AND STABILIZATION ACTIVITY ANALYZED
OPERATIONS IN GLOVEBOX 636
The following is a sequential listing ofthe metal opening operations that will normally be done in the 636 Glovebox. These steps were identified during the HE team meetings and are the substance of the activity rather than the final procedural form and format. These are the steps that are identified in the HE worksheets with an "OM" identifier in the "Node ID" column.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Segregate, remove or minimize all combustibles to far end ofglovebox Inspect outermost can to determine if it's a suspect (bulged, paneled, weight gained) can.
If suspect, punch can and wait until no further obvious reactions ongoing.
Open can with can opener
If lid falls in can, remove lid from can with dulled screwdriver or tweezers Inspect material within can.
If contents are another can, go to step 2 If contents are burning product, place slip-lid on top of product can. (may curtail operations until burning stops) -Seal it into a slip-lid can, bag it out, can it, and transfer it directly to Glovebox HC-2 I A to be thermally stabilized.
If contents appear to be normal product, pour contents into open container (tray, boat, can).
10.
Separate corrosion products from metal:
a. brush whole, stable button with bristle brush b. move clean stable button to a new can.
11.
If contents are not a whole, stable button (per STNOperator decision); re-can for transfer to Glovebox HC-21A.
When a maximum of 200 g of brushings have accumulated, can and transfer to Glovebox HC-2 1 A.
12.
Note: differences in operation in this GB636 & Glovebox HC-21A -636 handles it more, no canning in Glovebox HC-2lA, when opened in Glovebox HC-21A, it's poured into a boat, then conveyed to Glovebox HC-21C & thermally stabilized, and conveyed to and finally canned in GB18M.
SUBSEQUENT STABILIZATION OPERATIONS IN GLOVEBOXES HC-'LlA, HC-21C, AND HC-1SM
The following is a sequential listing ofthe metal opening operations that will normally be done in the Glovebox HC-21A. These steps were identified during the HE team meetings and are the substance of the activity rather than the final procedural form and format. These are the steps that are identified in the HE worksheets with an "TS" identifier in the "Node ID" column.
I . Seal-in Pu container into Glovebox HC-21 A, weigh Pu container, and furnace boat for Pu material accountability purposes.
2. Punch suspect (bulged or paneled) outer containers to relieve pressure or vacuum (typically performed in GB636).
3. Open Pu containers (includes punching and opening, if necessary, ofoverpack containers and inner container of Pu metal).
4. Remove materials (maybe corrosion products, metal or any combination of both) from containers and place in furnace boat.
5. Transfer furnace boat with boatcover to HC-2. Bag-out empty cans, plastic bags and tape as needed.
6. Transfer fiirnace boat with cover from Glovebox HC-21A to Glovebox HC-21C via conveyor or passed by hand via conveyor glovebox.
7. Remove the boatcover from the furnace boat, place boat in the furnace and operate the hrnace. In addition to the above operations, the relevant utilities associated with the plutonium metal stabilization process were examined. The specific utilities evaluated were the glovebox fire suppression system, the E-4 ventilation system that exhausts the gloveboxes, the power supply to the RMC Line equipment, and the 26-inch-Hg vacuum system that exhausts the muffle furnaces in Glovebox HC-2IC.
HAZARD EVALUATION METHODLOGY
The HE process is one that employs a systematic approach in the identification of hazards associated with a system, or process. The process is one in which the system or process is broken down into its basic elements and the hazards associated with each element are identified. Potential causes of those hazards are determined, potential consequences estimated and evaluated and possible corrective and/or preventative measures are considered. The HE was developed using a (AIChE 1992) .
The purpose and contents of each column i n the HE sample table, Table B-I, are described in detail in the following paragraphs.
Column 1, Node ID: This column provides an alpha-numeric identifier for each hazard postulated in the table. The identifier is primarily used for cross-referencing within the table and as an identifier for accident sequences.
Column 2,
Step #: The step or steps involved i n pel-forming each set of operations is identified in this column. Column 8, Consequcrice Category: This column is used to capture a code designator for the level of consequence associated with a hazardous event. The consequence ranking is the initial, qualitative estimate of the safety severity of the consequences. An alpha-numeric system has been used at the PFP to designate the severity of hazardous events. The system has the following "S" rankings characterizing safety consequences:
No effect outside the alovebox confinement systems; negligible safety concerns for the facility woi-ker.
Potential industrial injury, low radiological or chemical exposure dose consequences to the facility worker.
Potential severe harm or potential death from industrial injury, radiological dose or chemical exposure to the facility worker.
Potential significant radiological dose consequences or chemical exposure to onsite workers located outside the facility. Potential significant radiological dose consequences or chemical exposure to the offsite population.
Columii 9, Frequeucy Rmlting: This columii shows the estimated frequency of occurrence. The frequency ranking is a first cut, qualitative estimate ofthe likelihood of the hazardous event.
The following rankina system is used.
F3
Events that are expected to occur one or mol-e times during the lifetime of the facility, categorized as "anticipated" events. The frequency range associated with this category is lE-02/yr to O.l/yr.
Events that could occur during the lifetime of the facility, but with low probability. Such events are categorized as "unlikely" and fall in the range of 1E-04/yr to 1 E-O2/yr.
Events not expected to occur during the lifetime of the facility categorized as "extremely unlikely." The frequency range associated with this category is 1E-06/yr to IE-04/yr.
Events categorized as "beyond extremely unlikely," with a frequency less than 1E-06/yr. Events in this category (such as meteor strike) are so unlikely they generally do not require special controls.
F2 F1 FO
The frequency estimate, like the consequence I-anking, is assigned taking no credit for active engineered features.
Column 10, Remarks: This column contains miscellaneous observations or clarifying comments for a given hazard. Mr. Gelman received in BS in Chemical Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University, and his MBA from the University of Pittsburgh. He has 3 1 years of nuclear processing experience with the 23 ofthose at Hanford. He is the former facility manager for the Plutonium Finishing Plant, Hanford Waste Tank Processing Manager, Chemical Processing Quality Assurance Manager, 242-A Evaporator Restart Manager, TWRS Safety Basis Implementation Manager. He is regarded as an expert in nuclear facility management, conduct of operations, quality assurance, and program management. He is currently appointed to the ASME Nuclear Quality Assurance Subcommittee on Applications.
HAZARDS EVALUATION PARTICIPANTS
HAZARDS EVALUATION WORKSHEET ORGANIZATION
The HE table stnictiire used in this analysis is provided in Table A-I. The HE table is structured to ensure a systematic and thorough review of potential hazards. The thermal stabilization of metal and metal corrosioii products is broken down into logical sets of operations performed at specific locations. The operational steps covered in the analysis were identified from verbal descriptions provided by the cognizant engineers and other available information and were identified in section A.2. 
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Deviation Guides:
Node ID
OhI-8a
OhI-Xh
Ohl-9a
011-9h
Step # 
HAZARD EVALUATION RESULTS
